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Abstract
 Using the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DGSE) approach, this study assesses 
the feasibility of bilateral and multilateral monetary policy coordination among the ASEAN-5 
countries by comparing optimum welfare values of three types of interactions among them: 
(1) ?no coordination?; (2) ?bilateral coordination?; and (3) ?multilateral coordination?. 
 The central question in this study is whether monetary policy coordination among 
the ASEAN-5 countries can improve the welfare of the participating countries. Policy 
coordination is feasible when the welfare value for each country involved is higher than the 
welfare value when they pursue their monetary policy objectives without coordination.
 This study finds that moving from one interaction regime to another regime tend to 
change intermediate-good-producing firms? responsiveness of pricing decisions and 
elasticity of substitution between differentiated intermediate goods. There is no general 
rule on whether such moves will increase or decrease the degree of firms? responsiveness 
and elasticities of substitution. 
 This study also finds that coordination between Malaysia and the Philippines is the only 
feasible bilateral policy coordination among the ASEAN-5 countries. Multilateral policy 
coordination involving all the ASEAN-5 countries is not feasible. These findings show that 
welfare improvement from international monetary policy coordination is a particular case 
and not the general norm for the ASEAN-5 countries.
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1. Introduction
 As the ASEAN countries seek to continue integrating their economies to create the ASEAN 
Economic Community (AEC), there is a definite need for these countries to coordinate their policies 
in various areas. The establishments of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 1992, the Chiang 
Mai Initiative in 2000 (with China, Japan, and South Korea – the CJK countries), the Chiang Mai 
Initiative Multilateralization in 2010  (with the CJK), and the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research 
Office (AMRO) in 2011 are examples on how the ASEAN countries sought to coordinate their 
policies. This study explores the feasibility of international monetary policy coordination among the 
ASEAN-5 countries. 
 Various theoretical models on international policy coordination have been constructed, including 
those of Sutherland (2004), Berger and Wagner (2006), and Liu and Pappa (2007). Some 
empirical studies on international policy coordination in Asia or the ASEAN were conducted by 
Branson and Healy (2005), Truman (2011), Gupta (2012), Majuca (2013), Majuca and Pagaduan 
(2015), and Tan (2016). These studies share the same spirit: policy action in one country creates 
externalities in the other country. Many of these studies find that coordination can improve 
the welfare of the participating countries, as it helps in mitigating negative externalities and/or 
promoting positive externalities. 
 This study uses the Liu and Pappa?s (L-P) study as the primary reference as Liu and Pappa 
introduce a simple but comprehensive non-stochastic model that incorporate both fiscal and 
monetary policies. Liu and Pappa see potential welfare gains from coordination as planner under a 
coordination regime internalizes a terms-of-trade externality that independent central banks tend to 
overlook.
 This study uses dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DGSE) approach. The central question 
in this study is whether monetary policy coordination among the ASEAN-5 countries can improve 
the welfare of the participating countries. Policy coordination between participating countries is 
feasible when the welfare value for each country involved in coordination is higher than the welfare 
value when they pursue their monetary policy objectives without coordination. 
 The main contribution of this study is a construction of a model that is suitable to the empirical 
conditions of the ASEAN-5 countries. It modifies the L-P model by introducing the following items: 
(i) government spending on goods for households and bond coupon payment for households (in 
addition to subsidies for firms as in the L-P model); (ii) consumption and labor taxes on households 
(the L-P model does not incorporate taxes as one source of government revenues); (iii) government 
bonds that pay fixed coupon rate (replaces firm-issued state-contingent bonds in the L-P model); (iv) 
multilateral coordination case (in addition to the bilateral coordination case in the L-P model); (v) 
welfare distribution for countries involved in policy coordination based on their relative economic 
size (rather than divided equally as in the L-P model). All the ASEAN-5 countries? governments 
allocate funds in their budgets for spending on public goods and semi-public goods (such as for 
infrastructure development and social protection) and government bond coupon payments (as part 
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of public debt servicing), as well as collecting consumption tax and labor income tax (in the forms of 
value added tax and personal income tax). 
 This paper proceeds in the following direction. Section 2 elaborates the model used in this study. 
Section 3 describes the parameters, data, and data source. Section 4 analyzes results from this 
study. Section 5 concludes.
2. The Model
 This section only displays the Home economy side as the Foreign countries mirror the structure 
of the Home economy. Throughout this paper, subscripts ?t? refers to time index, ?n? to foreign 
country index, ?i? to index for firms in the non-traded sector, and ?j? to index for firms in the traded 
sector.
 The model assumes the existence of eleven countries representing the world: Home country and 
ten Foreign countries, where similar economic agents live in each economy. The eleven countries 
are: (1) Indonesia; (2) Malaysia; (3) Singapore; (4) Thailand; (5) the Philippines; (6) the European 
Union; (7) the United States; (8) China; (9) Japan; (10) South Korea; and (11) Australia. As this 
study focuses on policy interactions among the ASEAN-5 countries, it treats the remaining six 
countries as external environment.
 Externalities are transmitted across countries through trade and financial channels. Traded goods 
in the eleven countries are from domestic production and imports. Non-traded goods are assumed 
to be produced and consumed domestically. Bond markets are connected across countries, and 
there is international risk-sharing among these countries.
 This study assumes three types of policy interactions among the ASEAN-5 countries:
(i) No Coordination (Nash) regime 
 Government and central bank in the Home country make policies without coordinating with other 
countries. Central bank seeks to optimize Home country?s welfare by minimizing output gaps (which 
is the difference between the actual output of an economy and its potential output) and inflation 
rates in the traded and non-traded sectors while considering policies and outputs in other countries 
as given.  
(ii) Bilateral Coordination regime 
 There is a hypothetical supranational planner that seeks to optimize welfare in two ASEAN 
countries by setting fiscal and monetary policies in both countries while considering policies and 
outputs in the remaining nine countries as given. The supranational planner sets fiscal policies 
in each of the two countries independently. The monetary policies in the two countries are set 
interdependently: interest rate policy in each country is determined by considering output gaps and 
inflation rates in the traded and non-traded sectors of both countries. 
(iii) Multilateral Coordination regime 
 The supranational planner seeks to optimize welfare of the ASEAN-5 countries by setting fiscal 
and monetary policies in these countries while considering policies and outputs in the remaining six 
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countries as given. Fiscal policies in each of the ASEAN-5 countries are set independently, while the 
monetary policies in these five countries are set interdependently.
2.1 Economic Agents
 We assume the existence of four economic agents in each economy: (i) households; (ii) firms; (iii) 
government or supranational planner exercising fiscal policy; and (iv) central bank or supranational 
planner exercising monetary policy. 
2.1.1 Households
 There is a continuum of identical, infinitely-lived households. The representative household in 
each country is endowed with one unit of time and derives utility from consuming a basket of final 
goods  given price level  and subjective discount factor . Some portion of  is directly 
purchased by household , and the government provides the rest .   comprises non-traded 
goods  and traded goods . comprises domestically-produced traded goods  
and imported traded goods from Foreign Country-n , where n = 1, 2, ?, 10.
 Price level  is determined by the price index of non-traded goods  and price index of 
traded goods .  is determined by the price index of domestically-produced traded goods 
 and price index of imported traded goods from Foreign Country-n measured in domestic 
currency .  is defined as the value of domestic currency per foreign currency n.
  ? (1)
   ? (2)
  ? (3)
  ? (4)
where 
 = share of traded goods values to total values of goods in the economy; 
 =  share of domestically-produced traded goods values to total values of traded goods in the 
Home economy
 =  share of imported traded goods values from Foreign Country-n to total values of traded goods 
in the Home economy
 
 Household?s income at period t is in the form of wage , cash received from government transfers 
, and interest payment from holding government bonds . At period t, 
household supplies labor  to earn wage. Some portion of the wage is deducted to pay income 
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tax . By providing labor, household loses some part of its utility; this marginal loss is measured 
by the marginal disutility of labor . Household purchases government bonds at period t to 
accumulate assets. Household pays consumption tax  when purchasing goods. To simplify the 
model, we assume that tax rates are the same across time and economic sectors.
 The representative household in each economy faces three optimization problems:
(i)   Utility maximization subject to budget constraint to obtain the optimum real wage equation and 
the Euler equation
    
   subject to
     ? (5)
(ii)  Cost minimization of non-traded and traded goods consumption to get demand  functions for 
non-traded and traded goods 
    
     subject to
      ? (6)
(iii)  Cost minimization of domestically-produced and imported traded goods consumption to get 
demand functions for domestically produced and imported traded goods 
    
   
  subject to
      ? (7)
2.1.2 Firms
 There are two sectors in the economy: the non-traded sector and traded sector. For each sector, 
we differentiate between firms producing intermediate goods and firms producing final goods.  
2.1.2.1 Firms Producing Intermediate Goods
 In each sector, there is a continuum of firms producing differentiated intermediate goods 
indexed in the interval [0,1]. Each firm uses Constant Return to Scale (CRS) technology to produce 
intermediate goods using labor input, as depicted below:
 ? (8)
 ? (9)
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where  denotes non-traded intermediate goods produced in the Home economy;  denotes 
traded intermediate goods produced in the Home economy that comprises traded intermediate 
goods sold in the Home economy  and traded intermediate goods exported to the Foreign 
Country-n  and  are productivity shocks in the two sectors, and  and  are 
labor inputs in the two sectors. The productivity shocks in the non-traded and traded sectors are 
assumed to be correlated.
 The log-linearized form of productivity shocks in each sector follow a random walk process as 
stated below:
       
 ? (10)
  
 ? (11)
where
  ?log-linearized productivity shock in the non-traded sector
  ?log-linearized productivity shock in the traded sector   
  ?error terms for the non-traded sector
 ?error terms for the traded sector
  
are shock parameters
 Firms producing intermediate goods are assumed as price takers in the input market but 
monopolistic competitors in the product market. This study uses Calvo?s price setting assumption, 
where at each period firms are assumed to face a fixed probability of being allowed to change their 
price (Calvo in Sims, 2017). The probability of firms for being able to adjust their price at period t is 
1 –  in the non-traded sector and 1 –  in the traded sector. 
 The government provides subsidies to firms in the non-traded sector  and the traded sector 
 to reduce steady-state mark-up distortions. Corporate tax can be interpreted as a negative 
subsidy. 
 Firms producing non-traded intermediate goods face two optimization problems: 
(i)   Cost minimization to derive the optimum unit cost of labor in the non-traded sector   (which 
is the Lagrange multiplier obtained from optimization)
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   subject to
    ? (12)
(ii) Profit maximization to derive the optimum pricing rules for non-traded intermediate goods 
    ? (13)
    where  is the unit cost of firms in the non-traded sector at period  (which is identical across 
firms); and  is the demand for type-i non-traded intermediate goods at period .
 Firms producing intermediate goods in the traded sector face two optimization problems: 
(i)   Cost minimization to derive the optimum unit cost of labor in the traded sector  (which is the 
Lagrange multiplier obtained from optimization)
                              
   subject to
    ? (14)
(ii) Profit maximization to derive the optimum pricing rules for traded intermediate goods 
      
    with
     ? (15)
   where  is the unit cost of firms in the traded sector at period  (which is identical across firms 
since they face the same input market at Home);  is the demand for type-j traded intermediate 
goods at period  sold in the Home economy; and  is the demand for type-j traded intermediate 
goods at period  exported to the Foreign Country-n.
2.1.2.2 Firms Producing Final Goods
 This study assumes the existence of an infinite number of similar firms in each sector that 
transform intermediate goods to final goods according to the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
aggregation technology. 
 Final goods in the non-traded sector  are assumed to be entirely produced using domestic 
non-traded intermediate goods. In a differentiated intermediate traded goods market, domestically-
produced intermediate goods  and imported traded intermediate goods  of the same 
type are assumed to be substitutable and used to produce final goods in the traded sector . 
Aggregation of final goods in the non-traded and traded sectors are formulated as: 
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  ? (16)
  ? (17)
where 
 is the elasticity of substitution between differentiated products in the non-traded sector; and  is 
the elasticity of substitution between differentiated products in the traded sector. We set , ?1 
to ensure the existence of equilibrium. 
 The representative firm producing final goods in the non-traded sector faces the following 
optimization problems: 
(i)   Cost minimization to derive optimum labor unit cost in the non-traded sector  (which is the 
Lagrange multiplier obtained from optimization).
                              
   subject to
    ? (18)
(ii) Profit maximization to obtain Home demand function for non-traded intermediate goods.
     ? (19)
 The representative firm producing final goods in the traded sector faces the following optimization 
problems: 
(i)   Cost minimization to derive optimum labor unit cost in the traded sector  (which is the Lagrange 
multiplier obtained from optimization).
                              
   subject to
       ? (20)
(ii) Profit maximization to obtain Home demand function for traded intermediate goods
     ? (21)
2.1.2.3 Government (Supranational Planner on Fiscal Policy)
 The government or supranational planner is assumed to have a long-term horizon in making fiscal
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policy, rather than making policy to deal with short-term shocks. It seeks to find optimum labor 
allocations at the steady state that help households maximizing utility. Following assumptions in the 
L-P model, all shocks are shut-off, and pricing decisions are synchronized at the steady state such 
that , , and .
 The government or supranational planner?s total expenditure is allocated to five posts: (1) spending 
to provide goods for households ; (2) cash transfer to the households ; (3) interest payment 
to households purchasing government bonds in previous period ; (4) subsidy 
to firms producing non-traded goods ; and (5) subsidy to firms producing traded goods . 
When purchasing goods, the government also pay consumption tax.
 At period t,  comprises government spending on non-traded goods  and traded goods 
, where  consists of government spending on domestically-produced traded goods  
and imported traded goods . Relations among , , , , and  are described by 
the following equations:
 ? (22) 
  ? (23)
 To generate revenues for its expenditures, the government (supranational planner) collects 
consumption tax  and labor income tax , as well as issuing government bonds . Revenues 
generated by the supranational planner in a country can only be expensed in the respective country. 
 By assuming that tax rates remain the same across the time, the government (supranational 
planner?s) fiscal balance at time t can be formulated as
 ? (24)
 The government (supranational planner) faces three optimization problems: 
(i)   Utility maximization to obtain optimum labor allocations in the non-traded and traded sectors at 
steady state
    
   subject to
   
    ? (25)
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(ii)  Cost minimization of government spending on non-traded and traded goods to get the 
government / supranational planner?s demand functions for non-traded and traded goods at time t
     
    subject to
       ? (26)
(iii)  Cost minimization of domestically-produced and imported traded goods consumption to obtain 
the government / supranational planner?s demand functions for domestically-produced and 
imported traded goods at time t
    
    subject to
      ? (27)
2.1.2.4 Central Bank (Supranational Planner on Monetary Policy)
 A central bank (supranational planner) is assumed to focus on managing short-term shocks in 
the economy rather than pursuing long-term objectives, using interest rate as the sole instrument to 
exercise monetary policy. 
 It seeks to optimize welfare by minimizing a social objective function subject to private sector?s 
(which are households? and firms?) optimizing conditions. The objective function includes a 
loss function that contains variables of output gaps in the non-traded and traded sectors (  
and ), inflation in the two sectors (  and ), as well as parameters that measure elasticity of 
substitutions between differentiated products in the two sectors (  and ) and responsiveness of 
pricing decisions to variations in the real marginal cost gaps of the two sectors (  and ). Nominal 
interest rate gap ( ), which is the gap between the short-term nominal interest rate from its natural 
rate, serves as a control variable in the model. 
 Welfare optimization problem for the central bank in the Home economy under the ?No 
Coordination?  regime is formulated as
subject to
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where  terms independent of policy and shocks 
? (28)
?   terms of third or higher order in an appropriate bound on the amplitude of the 
shocks
 Under the ?Bilateral Coordination? or the ?Multilateral Coordination? regime, the supranational 
planner seeks to optimize ?welfare contribution? of each participating country as a part of ?collective 
welfare?. From the collective welfare, each participating country receives ?welfare share?, which is 
distributed based on its relative economic size to the total size of all participating countries.
 Welfare optimization problem for the supranational planner under the ?Bilateral Coordination? 
regime  is formulated as
subject to
where
 
? (29)
,  terms independent of policy and shocks
  terms of third or higher order in an appropriate bound on the amplitude of 
the shocks
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 Welfare optimization problem for the supranational planner under the ?Multilateral Coordination? 
regime  is formulated as
subject to
Home country?s constraints
and the following constraints from the other ASEAN-5 countries
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 ? (30)
where
,  terms independent of policy and shocks
  terms of third or higher order in an appropriate bound on the amplitude of 
the shocks
2.2 Market Clearing Conditions
 The market clearing conditions are defined as:
Home-produced non-traded goods market clearing condition 
  ? (31) 
Home-produced traded goods market clearing condition 
   ? (32)
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Labor market clearing condition in the Home economy
  ? (33)
International bond market clearing condition
  ? (34)
2.3 International Risk-Sharing Conditions
 The international risk-sharing comprises the following conditions:
Net exports under the balanced-trade steady state 
  ? (35)
Bilateral risk-sharing condition (with Foreign Country-n) under the balanced-trade steady state from 
the perspective of the Home economy 
   ? (36)
2.4 Flexible-Price (Natural Rate) Equilibrium 
 The natural rate equilibrium is defined as a condition where prices are flexible to adjust to shocks. 
It comprises: 
The natural rate of output in the non-traded sector
  ? (37)
The natural rate of output in the traded sector
 ? (38)
The natural rate terms of trade between the Home economy and Foreign Country-n 
 ? (39)
The natural rate of aggregate consumption
  ? (40)
The real interest rate at the natural rate equilibrium
    ? (41)
The relative price of non-traded goods in terms of traded goods at the natural rate equilibrium
  ? (42)
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2.5 Sticky-Price Equilibrium 
 The sticky price equilibrium comprises: 
Phillips curves in the non-traded sector
  ? (43)
Phillips curves in the traded sector
   ? (44)
Relation between changes of output in the non-traded and traded sectors
 ? (45)
Relations between output gap, inflation, and productivity shocks
  ? (46)
3. Parameters, Data, and Data Sources
 Calibrated parameters in this study are parameters whose values can be directly obtained or 
calculated using available data, while estimated parameters are the parameters whose values are not 
directly observable but can be obtained by solving the natural rate equilibrium equations. The rest 
of parameters are derived from the calibrated and estimated parameter values.
 The calibrated parameters are: (i) relative size of the Home economy to the World of 11 Countries 
( ); (ii) discount factor in the Home economy ( ); (iii) share of traded goods values to the total 
values of goods in the Home economy ( ); and (iv) share of domestically-produced traded goods 
values to the total values of traded goods in the Home economy ( ). The long-run interest rate is 
calibrated following Ramayandi (2008). The shock parameters  are calibrated to have 
the model converged.
 The estimated parameters are: (a) responsiveness of pricing decision to variations in the real 
marginal cost gap in the non-traded sector ( ); (b) responsiveness of pricing decision to variations 
in the real marginal cost gap in the traded sector ( ); (c) elasticity of substitution between 
differentiated products in the non-traded sector ( ); and (d) elasticity of substitution between 
differentiated products in the traded sector ( ). 
 Parameters derived from the calibrated and estimated parameters are: (1) probability for 
intermediate-good-producing firms to adjust prices in the non-traded sector ( ); (2) probability for 
intermediate-good-producing firms to adjust prices in the traded sector ( ); (3) steady-state price 
markup in the non-traded sector ( ); and (4) steady-state price markup in the traded sector 
( ).
 Gross domestic product (GDP) and consumer price index (CPI) data used in the model are 
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obtained from CEIC, while the yields of 10-year government bonds are from Bloomberg. The 
data range is from Q3-2003 to Q4-2016. Trade and nominal GDP data are obtained from the 
IMF Directions of Trade Statistics and World Economic Outlook Database, respectively. Output 
gap data are obtained from real GDP data after rebasing, seasonally adjusting, and filtering using 
the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter. Quarter on quarter inflation data is obtained from CPI data after 
rebasing and seasonally adjusting.
 GDP and CPI data with different base years need to be rebased (rescaled) to obtain a long and 
consistent time series. This study follows the GDP base year rescaling method as used by the World 
Bank. For example, Indonesia?s GDP data using the 2000 base year is rebased to the 2010 base year 
by first creating an index dividing each year of the base year 2000 series by its 2010 value and then 
multiplying each year?s index result by the corresponding 2010 value1. This study uses the same 
rebasing method for the CPI.  
 After rebasing, the time series data needs to be cleansed from the seasonal and cyclical 
components to allow us to focus on the long-term trends. Seasonal adjustment is used to remove 
seasonal components from the time series data, while HP filter is used to extract the trend 
component of a time series from short-term fluctuations associated with business cycle.
4. Results and Analysis
 Table 1 displays the values of calibrated parameters. Instead of following calibrations in the L-P 
model, this study uses different values of calibrated parameters, as in reality each of the ASEAN-5 
countries has different , , and  values. In the L-P two-country model the two countries are 
calibrated to have the same values of   and ; while  is 
examined for the case of symmetric trading structures case and asymmetric case 
. Unlike the L-P model that calibrates , this study estimates the 
values of  and  for each of the ASEAN-5 countries. Table 2 displays parameter estimates for 
each ASEAN-5 countries under the three policy interaction regimes. The results show that among 
the ASEAN-5 countries, intermediate-good-producing firms in Singapore?s non-trade and traded 
sectors have lowest probabilities to change prices, presumably because Singapore?s markets are 
very competitive. Regarding the elasticity of substitution between differentiated intermediate goods 
in the non-traded sector, Thailand has the highest elasticity while the Philippines has the lowest 
elasticity among the ASEAN-5 countries. As for the elasticity of substitution between differentiated 
intermediate goods in the traded sector, Indonesia has the highest elasticity while Malaysia has 
the lowest. Higher elasticity of differentiated intermediate goods implies lower bargaining power 
of intermediate-good-producing firms against final-good-producing firms in the intermediate goods 
market.
 Table 3 displays the Z-test results of comparison between parameter estimates (which are 
the posterior means) under different regimes: (i) between ?no coordination? versus ?bilateral 
coordination? regimes; (ii) between ?no coordination? versus ?multilateral coordination? regimes; 
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and (iii) between ?bilateral coordination? and ?multilateral coordination? regimes.  
 Most of the parameter estimates are significantly different under different regimes, but there 
are some cases where the estimates are not significantly different. It implies that moving from 
one interaction regime to another regime tend to change intermediate-good-producing firms? 
responsiveness of pricing decisions and elasticity of substitution between differentiated intermediate 
goods. Thus, in most cases, regime change will cause firms to change their pricing behavior. 
However, there is no general rule on whether moving from one regime to another regime will 
increase or decrease the value of parameters. 
 Table 4 displays steady-state inflation rates, output gaps, nominal interest rate gaps, and welfare 
values (in unit, not in percentage) of the ASEAN-5 countries. Under the ?no coordination? regimes, 
the non-traded and traded sector?s inflation rates and output gaps, and nominal interest rate gaps in 
all the ASEAN-5 countries are equal to zero. In all cases for the ASEAN-5 countries, inflation rates, 
output gaps, and nominal interest rate gaps under the ?bilateral coordination? and ?multilateral 
coordination? regimes are negative. The steady-state values of all of these variables under the 
?multilateral coordination? regime are lower than under the ?bilateral coordination? regimes.
 In almost all cases, the welfare values under the ?no coordination? regime are higher than under 
the ?bilateral coordination? regimes. The only exception is bilateral coordination between Malaysia 
and the Philippines, where the collective welfare and distributed welfare values are higher than 
those under ?no coordination? regimes. One possible explanation of such a feasibility is because the 
two countries have rather similar economic sizes and the share of imported traded goods to the total 
of non-traded and traded goods in the economy ( ) compared with the other ASEAN-5 countries. 
 In all cases, welfare values under the ?multilateral coordination? regime are always lower than 
those under the ?no coordination? and ?bilateral coordination? regimes. 
 Thus, this study provides only weak support to the hypothesis that international monetary policy 
coordination can improve the welfare of the participating countries as suggested by Liu and Pappa.
5. Conclusion
 This study finds that policy coordination between Malaysia and the Philippines is the only 
feasible bilateral policy coordination among the ASEAN-5 countries. Multilateral policy coordination 
involving all the ASEAN-5 countries is not feasible. Hence welfare improvement from international 
monetary policy coordination is rather a special case and not the general norm for the ASEAN-5 
countries.
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Endnote
1  See https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/114946-how-can-i-rescale-a-series-to-a-different-
???????? 
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APPENDIX
Table 1. Calibrated Parameters for the ASEAN-5 Countries
Parameter Indonesia Malaysia Singapore Thailand The Philippines
?n 0.013 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.004
?n 0.978 0.990 0.994 0.991 0.983
?n 0.472 0.455 0.192 0.397 0.357
?n 0.678 0.394 0.100 0.365 0.414
0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70
Source: Author?s calculation
MALAYSIA
Parameter 
No 
Coordination
Bilateral Coordination with ASEAN-5 
Multilateral 
CoordinationIndonesia Singapore Thailand
The 
Philippines
?N 0.3299 0.3306 0.3297 0.3304 0.3311 0.3289
?T 0.8865 0.8870 0.8864 0.8869 0.8829 0.8793
?N 0.5694 0.5709 0.5691 0.5691 0.5695 0.5709
?T 0.4037 0.4047 0.4035 0.4036 0.4048 0.4057
?N 5.2563 5.2675 5.2317 5.2408 5.2450 5.2276
?T 1.4882 1.5194 1.5145 1.5204 1.5428 1.6378
1??N 2.2349 2.2343 2.2363 2.2358 2.2356 2.2365
1??T 4.0483 3.9253 3.9436 3.9216 3.8423 3.5679
Table 2. Estimated and Derived Parameter Values for the ASEAN-5 Countries
INDONESIA
Parameter
No 
Coordination
Bilateral Coordination with ASEAN-5 
Multilateral 
CoordinationMalaysia Singapore Thailand
The 
Philippines
?N 0.9542 0.9575 0.9546 0.9561 0.9576 0.9642
?T 1.2388 1.2368 1.2390 1.2372 1.2362 1.2327
?N 0.3924 0.3914 0.3918 0.3916 0.3917 0.3898
?T 0.3476 0.3476 0.3472 0.3475 0.3479 0.3478
?N 9.7077 9.7938 9.7400 9.7488 9.7744 9.8785
?T 13.5827 13.5540 13.5489 13.5713 13.5554 13.5131
1??N 2.1148 2.1137 2.1144 2.1143 2.1140 2.1126
1??T 2.0795 2.0797 2.0797 2.0795 2.0796 2.0799
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SINGAPORE
Parameter 
No 
Coordination
Bilateral Coordination with ASEAN-5 
Multilateral 
CoordinationIndonesia Malaysia Thailand
The 
Philippines
?N 0.0024 0.0033 0.0032 0.0024 0.0028 0.0119
?T 0.2066 0.2431 0.2376 0.2084 0.2196 0.6282
?N 0.9549 0.9517 0.9486 0.9556 0.9533 0.9028
?T 0.6387 0.6178 0.6190 0.6378 0.6311 0.4637
?N 3.0007 3.0168 3.0107 3.0075 3.0069 1.8081
?T 4.2752 4.1467 4.1541 4.2493 4.1664 2.2795
1??N 2.4998 2.4958 2.4973 2.4981 2.4983 3.2375
1??T 2.3053 2.3178 2.3170 2.3078 2.3158 2.7816
THAILAND
Parameter 
No 
Coordination
Bilateral Coordination with ASEAN-5 
Multilateral 
CoordinationIndonesia Malaysia Singapore
The 
Philippines
?N 1.0033 1.0031 1.0023 1.0031 1.0025 1.0026
?T 0.7406 0.7431 0.7409 0.7404 0.7417 0.7827
?N 0.3824 0.3833 0.3826 0.3822 0.3828 0.3831
?T 0.4346 0.4352 0.4346 0.4345 0.4348 0.4258
?N 11.2428 11.2382 11.2577 11.2478 11.2489 11.2204
?T 5.7638 5.7868 5.7469 5.7554 5.7676 5.1000
1??N 2.0976 2.0977 2.0975 2.0976 2.0976 2.0978
1??T 2.2099 2.2089 2.2107 2.2103 2.2097 2.2439
THE PHILIPPINES
Parameter 
No 
Coordination
Bilateral Coordination with ASEAN-5 
Multilateral 
CoordinationIndonesia Malaysia Singapore Thailand
?N 0.1394 0.1411 0.1411 0.1418 0.1405 0.0331
?T 1.2941 1.2945 1.2937 1.2945 1.2934 1.5146
?N 0.6947 0.6942 0.6920 0.6908 0.6928 0.8394
?T 0.3398 0.3401 0.3395 0.3392 0.3396 0.3134
?N 1.6254 1.6217 1.6077 1.6106 1.6252 6.4897
?T 7.9414 7.9310 7.9521 7.9412 7.9358 6.7084
1??N 3.5990 3.6085 3.6455 3.6377 3.5995 2.1822
1??T 2.1441 2.1443 2.1438 2.1441 2.1442 2.1752
Source: Author?s calculation
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Table 3. Z-test Results for Parameter Estimates under Different Regimes
at 5? Significance Level
H
0
: No significant difference between means; H
1
: Significant difference between means
?N ?T ?N ?T
No Coordination
vs.
Bilateral Coordination
IDNC vs. ID-MY?
IDNC vs. ID-SG
IDNC vs. ID-TH?
IDNC vs. ID-PH?
MYNC vs. MY-ID
MYNC vs. MY-SG
MYNC vs. MY-TH
MYNC vs. MY-PH?
SGNC vs. SG-ID?
SGNC vs. SG-MY
SGNC vs. SG-TH
SGNC vs. SG-PH
THNC vs. TH-ID
THNC vs. TH-MY
THNC vs. TH-SG
THNC vs. TH-PH
PHNC vs. PH-ID?
PHNC vs. PH-MY?
PHNC vs. PH-SG?
PHNC vs. PH-TH?
IDNC vs. ID-MY?
IDNC vs. ID-SG
IDNC vs. ID-TH?
IDNC vs. ID-PH?
MYNC vs. MY-ID
MYNC vs. MY-SG
MYNC vs. MY-TH
MYNC vs. MY-PH?
SGNC vs. SG-ID?
SGNC vs. SG-MY?
SGNC vs. SG-TH?
SGNC vs. SG-PH?
THNC vs. TH-ID?
THNC vs. TH-MY
THNC vs. TH-SG
THNC vs. TH-PH?
PHNC vs. PH-ID
PHNC vs. PH-MY
PHNC vs. PH-SG
PHNC vs. PH-TH
IDNC vs. ID-MY?
IDNC vs. ID-SG?
IDNC vs. ID-TH?
IDNC vs. ID-PH?
MYNC vs. MY-ID?
MYNC vs. MY-SG?
MYNC vs. MY-TH?
MYNC vs. MY-PH?
SGNC vs. SG-ID?
SGNC vs. SG-MY?
SGNC vs. SG-TH
SGNC vs. SG-PH
THNC vs. TH-ID?
THNC vs. TH-MY?
THNC vs. TH-SG
THNC vs. TH-PH
PHNC vs. PH-ID
PHNC vs. PH-MY?
PHNC vs. PH-SG?
PHNC vs. PH-TH
IDNC vs. ID-MY?
IDNC vs. ID-SG?
IDNC vs. ID-TH?
IDNC vs. ID-PH?
MYNC vs. MY-ID?
MYNC vs. MY-SG?
MYNC vs. MY-TH?
MYNC vs. MY-PH?
SGNC vs. SG-ID?
SGNC vs. SG-MY?
SGNC vs. SG-TH?
SGNC vs. SG-PH?
THNC vs. TH-ID?
THNC vs. TH-MY?
THNC vs. TH-SG
THNC vs. TH-PH
PHNC vs. PH-ID?
PHNC vs. PH-MY?
PHNC vs. PH-SG
PHNC vs. PH-TH
No Coordination
vs.
Multilateral Coordination
IDNC vs. IDMC?
MYNC vs. MYMC?
SGNC vs. SGMC?
THNC vs. THMC
PHNC vs. PHMC?
IDNC vs. IDMC?
MYNC vs. MYMC?
SGNC vs. SGMC?
THNC vs. THMC?
PHNC vs. PHMC?
IDNC vs. IDMC?
MYNC vs. MYMC?
SGNC vs. SGMC?
THNC vs. THMC?
PHNC vs. PHMC?
IDNC vs. IDMC?
MYNC vs. MYMC?
SGNC vs. SGMC?
THNC vs. THMC?
PHNC vs. PHMC?
Bilateral Coordination
vs.
Multilateral Coordination
ID-MY vs. IDMC?
ID-SG vs. IDMC?
ID-TH vs. IDMC?
ID-PH vs. IDMC?
MY-ID vs. MYMC?
MY-SG vs. MYMC
MY-TH vs. MYMC?
MY-PH vs. MYMC?
SG-ID vs. SGMC?
SG-MY vs. SGMC?
SG-TH vs. SGMC?
SG-PH vs. SGMC?
TH-ID vs. THMC
TH-MY vs. THMC
TH-SG vs. THMC
TH-PH vs. THMC
PH-ID vs. PHMC?
PH-MY vs. PHMC?
PH-SG vs. PHMC?
PH-TH vs. PHMC?
ID-MY vs. IDMC?
ID-SG vs. IDMC?
ID-TH vs. IDMC?
ID-PH vs. IDMC?
MY-ID vs. MYMC?
MY-SG vs. MYMC?
MY-TH vs. MYMC?
MY-PH vs. MYMC?
SG-ID vs. SGMC?
SG-MY vs. SGMC?
SG-TH vs. SGMC?
SG-PH vs. SGMC?
TH-ID vs. THMC?
TH-MY vs. THMC?
TH-SG vs. THMC?
TH-PH vs. THMC?
PH-ID vs. PHMC?
PH-MY vs. PHMC?
PH-SG vs. PHMC?
PH-TH vs. PHMC?
ID-MY vs. IDMC
ID-SG vs. IDMC?
ID-TH vs. IDMC?
ID-PH vs. IDMC?
MY-ID vs. MYMC?
MY-SG vs. MYMC
MY-TH vs. MYMC?
MY-PH vs. MYMC?
SG-ID vs. SGMC?
SG-MY vs. SGMC?
SG-TH vs. SGMC?
SG-PH vs. SGMC?
TH-ID vs. THMC?
TH-MY vs. THMC?
TH-SG vs. THMC?
TH-PH vs. THMC?
PH-ID vs. PHMC?
PH-MY vs. PHMC?
PH-SG vs. PHMC?
PH-TH vs. PHMC?
ID-MY vs. IDMC?
ID-SG vs. IDMC?
ID-TH vs. IDMC?
ID-PH vs. IDMC?
MY-ID vs. MYMC?
MY-SG vs. MYMC?
MY-TH vs. MYMC?
MY-PH vs. MYMC?
SG-ID vs. SGMC?
SG-MY vs. SGMC?
SG-TH vs. SGMC?
SG-PH vs. SGMC?
TH-ID vs. THMC?
TH-MY vs. THMC?
TH-SG vs. THMC?
TH-PH vs. THMC?
PH-ID vs. PHMC?
PH-MY vs. PHMC?
PH-SG vs. PHMC?
PH-TH vs. PHMC?
Note: ? = significant at 5? significance level 
Source: Author?s calculation
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Table 4. Steady State Inflation Rates, Output Gaps, and Welfare Values 
INDONESIA
Variable No Coordination
Bilateral Coordination with ASEAN-5 
Multilateral 
CoordinationMalaysia Singapore Thailand
The 
Philippines
y_n_tilde_id 0.000000 ?0.000012 ?0.000006 ?0.000006 ?0.000011 ?0.000027
y_t_tilde_id 0.000000 ?0.000119 ?0.000060 ?0.000062 ?0.000105 ?0.000270
inf_n_id 0.000000 ?0.000580 ?0.000311 ?0.000314 ?0.000465 ?0.001659
inf_h_id 0.000000 ?0.007621 ?0.004089 ?0.004133 ?0.006079 ?0.021936
r_cap_id 0.000000 ?0.003290 ?0.001763 ?0.001783 ?0.002630 ?0.009430
Welfare_id ?0.083697 ?0.179494 ?1.103409 ?0.204164 ?0.120213 ?24.033512
MALAYSIA
Variable No Coordination
Bilateral Coordination with ASEAN-5 
Multilateral 
CoordinationIndonesia Singapore Thailand
The 
Philippines
y_n_tilde_my 0.000000 ?0.000020 ?0.000036 ?0.000038 ?0.000047 ?0.000209
y_t_tilde_my 0.000000 ?0.000164 ?0.000299 ?0.000313 ?0.000386 ?0.001713
inf_n_my 0.000000 ?0.000800 ?0.001799 ?0.001599 ?0.001435 ?0.005660
inf_h_my 0.000000 ?0.013116 ?0.029858 ?0.026460 ?0.023580 ?0.092668
r_cap_my 0.000000 ?0.003904 ?0.008845 ?0.007858 ?0.007048 ?0.027778
Welfare_my ?0.092274 ?0.069036 ?2.760305 ?0.374791 ?0.087399 ?9.243659
THE PHILIPPINES
Variable No Coordination
Bilateral Coordination with ASEAN-5 
Multilateral 
CoordinationIndonesia Malaysia Singapore Thailand
y_n_tilde_ph 0.000000 ?0.000003 ?0.000015 ?0.000011 ?0.000028 ?0.000063
y_t_tilde_ph 0.000000 ?0.000006 ?0.000026 ?0.000019 ?0.000048 ?0.000108
inf_n_ph 0.000000 ?0.000032 ?0.000229 ?0.000131 ?0.000465 ?0.000857
inf_h_ph 0.000000 ?0.000353 ?0.002531 ?0.001442 ?0.005153 ?0.009475
r_cap_ph 0.000000 ?0.000096 ?0.000676 ?0.000389 ?0.001373 ?0.002540
Welfare_ph ?0.087182 ?0.036989 ?0.069919 ?1.310387 ?0.243931 ?7.394927
Source: Author?s calculation
THAILAND
Variable No Coordination
Bilateral Coordination with ASEAN-5 
Multilateral 
CoordinationIndonesia Malaysia Singapore
The 
Philippines
y_n_tilde_th 0.000000 ?0.000004 ?0.000005 ?0.000001 ?0.000007 ?0.000022
y_t_tilde_th 0.000000 ?0.000149 ?0.000195 ?0.000039 ?0.000240 ?0.000794
inf_n_th 0.000000 ?0.000236 ?0.000574 ?0.000140 ?0.000551 ?0.001510
inf_h_th 0.000000 ?0.006666 ?0.016536 ?0.004057 ?0.015764 ?0.042972
r_cap_th 0.000000 ?0.001514 ?0.003709 ?0.000908 ?0.003550 ?0.009715
Welfare_th ?0.092186 ?0.094230 ?0.449749 ?0.102043 ?0.365896 ?11.092390
SINGAPORE
Variable No Coordination
Bilateral Coordination with ASEAN-5 
Multilateral 
CoordinationIndonesia Malaysia Thailand
The 
Philippines
y_n_tilde_sg 0.000000 ?0.000114 ?0.000100 ?0.000009 ?0.000054 ?0.000441
y_t_tilde_sg 0.000000 ?0.014911 ?0.013801 ?0.001261 ?0.007492 ?0.058572
inf_n_sg 0.000000 ?0.001300 ?0.002501 ?0.000239 ?0.001789 ?0.005967
inf_t_sg 0.000000 ?0.169867 ?0.345030 ?0.033026 ?0.249731 ?0.792157
r_cap_sg 0.000000 ?0.005670 ?0.010869 ?0.001038 ?0.007770 ?0.026006
Welfare_sg ?0.093033 ?0.424388 ?2.760305 ?0.085036 ?1.637984 ?9.243659
